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THE NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT AN
EMPLOYER'S FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES
CAN CONSTITUTE REASONABLE CAUSE
FOR FAILURE TO PAY EMPLOYMENT
TAXES- VAN CAMP & BENNION,
P.S. V. UNITED STATES
Sarah S. Brieden*
HE Courts of Appeals have differed in determining whether a tax-
payer's financial difficulties can constitute "reasonable cause" suf-
ficient to waive the penalty, required by the Internal Revenue
Code, for failure to pay employment taxes.1 The Sixth Circuit, in Brew-
ery v. United States,2 established the rule that financial difficulties cannot,
as a matter of law, constitute reasonable cause for failure to pay both the
trust fund and the non-trust fund portions of employment taxes. 3 The
Second 4 and Third 5 Circuits have rejected Brewery's rule. Most recently,
in Van Camp & Bennion, P.S. v. United States,6 the Ninth Circuit joined
the Second and Third Circuits in rejecting the Brewery rule, holding that
financial difficulties can constitute reasonable cause for failure to pay em-
ployment taxes.7 The court stated that following the Sixth Circuit's rea-
soning would effectively do away with the reasonable cause exception to
penalties. 8 By rejecting the Brewery rule, the court failed to consider two
points: (1) a portion of the employment taxes were withheld from em-
* Candidate for J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law, 2003;
M.S., Texas A&M University, 2000; B.B.A, summa cum laude, Texas A&M University,
2000.
1. The Internal Revenue Code sections that deal with penalties for failure to pay tax
and failure to make deposits both require an addition to the tax owed "unless it is shown
that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect." 26 U.S.C.
§ 6651 (1989 & Supp. 2001) (failure to file tax return or to pay tax) and 26 U.S.C. § 6656
(1989 & Supp. 2001) (failure to make deposit of taxes). For a discussion of what is consid-
ered reasonable cause, see Joyce L. Sugawara et al., Defining Reasonableness Before the
Internal Revenue Service, L.A. LAW., May 2000.
2. Brewery v. United States, 33 F.3d 589 (6th Cir. 1994).
3. Id. at 592-94.
4. Fran Corp. v. United States, 164 F.3d 814, 818 (2d Cir. 1999).
5. East Wind Indus., Inc. v. United States, 196 F.3d 499, 508 (3d Cir. 1999).
6. Van Camp & Bennion, P.S. v. United States, 251 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2001).
7. Id. at 869.
8. Id.
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ployees' paychecks and technically held in trust for the government, and
(2) factors other than financial difficulties can constitute reasonable
cause, 9 and therefore, the reasonable cause exception is still available to
taxpayers without considering financial difficulties.
Walter R. Van Camp and Irving R. Bennion, both attorneys, owned
60% and 40%, respectively, of the professional services corporation Van
Camp & Bennion, P.S. ("the Corporation").' 0 Van Camp served as the
Corporation's president and Bennion was the vice president and secre-
tary-treasurer. 1
Van Camp, a specialist in personal injury, attracted clients to the firm' 2
and performed the vast majority of the legal services provided by the
Corporation. 13 On the other hand, Bennion's involvement with the Cor-
poration was limited and he carried a reduced case load. 14 Because 99%
of Van Camp's fees came from contingent fee agreements, the Corpora-
tion's income and cash flows were irregular.15
The Corporation suffered financial difficulties in 1989.16 Van Camp ex-
perienced serious personal problems, which included long-term hospital-
izations, depression, divorce, personal bankruptcy, and the loss of several
associates of the firm.17 These personal problems negatively affected Van
Camp's ability to provide legal services to his clients.' 8 They also resulted
in the Corporation's insolvency from 1989 to 1991.19 Because of limited
cash flow, the Corporation failed to pay employment taxes in 1989 and
1991.20
After an IRS audit, the Corporation paid $34,000 in withholding and
social security taxes, interest, and penalties that the Corporation failed to
pay in 1989 and 1991.21 The IRS rejected a timely-filed claim for a refund
of this payment.22 The Corporation then filed a complaint in federal
court for a refund of the payment. 23 This case was consolidated with a
second complaint seeking a refund of other taxes, interest, and penalties
9. See United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 243 n.1 (1985). The IRS has given eight
reasons for late filing that it considers reasonable cause. Id. (citing Internal Revenue Man-
ual (CCH) § 4350, (24) 22.2(2) (Mar. 20, 1980)).
10. Van Camp, 251 F.3d at 864.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Van Camp & Bennion, P.S. v. United States, No. CS-94-409-CI, 1996 WL 529225,
at *2-3 (E.D. Wash. July 17, 1996).
14. Id. at *3.
15. Id. at *2.
16. Id. at *1.
17. Id. at *6.
18. Van Camp & Bennion, 1996 WL 529225, at *6.
19. Id.
20. Van Camp, 251 F.3d at 864.
21. Van Camp & Bennion, 1996 WL 529225, at *1.
22. Id.
23. Id. The original complaint was filed in the Western District of Washington, but
was transferred to the Eastern District of Washington.
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relating to the wages paid to Van Camp and Bennion.24 In its complaints,
the Corporation claimed, in part, that the penalties paid on the taxes
should be abated because financial difficulties experienced by the Corpo-
ration constituted reasonable cause to excuse the failure to pay the
taxes. 25
Following the Brewery rule, the district court concluded that the Cor-
poration's financial problems 26 did not, as a matter of law, constitute rea-
sonable cause for failure to pay employment taxes.27 The Ninth Circuit
rejected the reasoning in Brewery holding that financial difficulties may
constitute reasonable cause.28 The court reversed the district court's rul-
ing and remanded the case for a determination of whether the Corpora-
tion's problems actually were reasonable cause.29
Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge Beezer considered the Corpora-
tion's assertion that penalties were not due on the unpaid employment
taxes. 30 He noted that the Sixth Circuit3' disagreed with the Second 32
and Third33 Circuits on whether financial difficulties of the taxpayer cor-
poration excuse nonpayment of employment taxes.34 In this case of first
impression for the Ninth Circuit,35 Judge Beezer considered the conflict-
ing reasoning of the courts that previously decided this issue to determine
if financial difficulties can constitute reasonable cause for failure to pay
employment taxes.36
The court concluded that financial difficulties of the taxpayer corpora-
tion may constitute reasonable cause for failure to pay employment taxes
and determined that the penalties for failure to pay may be excused. 37
The Ninth Circuit, in so holding, agreed with the Fran Corp. v. United
States and East Wind Industries, Inc. v. United States decisions and re-
jected the "bright line rule" of the Brewery case that financial difficulties
24. Id. The IRS assessed a deficiency against the corporation for failure to pay em-
ployment taxes with respect to wages paid to Bennion and Van Camp. Van Camp, 251 F.3d
at 864. The Corporation asserted that the attorneys were not employees of the corpora-
tion, but were independent contractors, and therefore the corporation was not responsible
for employment taxes for these wages. Id. On this issue, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's ruling that Van Camp was an employee of the firm while Bennion was an
independent contractor. Id. at 865.
25. Van Camp, 251 F.3d at 866.
26. As part of its factual findings, the district court concluded that Van Camp's testi-
mony about the personal problems he experienced was credible. Van Camp, 251 F.3d at
867. The court further concluded that the problems faced by Van Camp placed sufficient
financial stress on the Corporation to put its survival in question. Id. at 868.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 867.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 866-67.
31. Brewery, 33 F.3d at 592-94.
32. Fran, 164 F.3d at 816-18.
33. East Wind, 196 F.3d at 504-08.
34. Van Camp, 251 F.3d at 867.
35. Id.
36. ld. at 866-67.
37. Id. at 868.
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cannot, as a matter of law, constitute reasonable cause.38 As part of its
analysis, the court said, "If the potential ruin of a corporation is not rele-
vant, then the reasonable cause exception is virtually meaningless. '39
Citing the Third Circuit's opinion in East Wind, the court noted that
Treasury Regulations40 require the court to look at the taxpayer's finan-
cial situation when determining if the taxpayer had reasonable cause for
failure to pay taxes.41 The court found that the facts in this case illus-
trated the need to reject the Sixth Circuit's reasoning because the per-
sonal and financial difficulties of Van Camp put the survival of the
company in jeopardy.42
The Van Camp court should have affirmed the district court's ruling, at
least with respect to the trust fund portion of the tax liability. The Brew-
ery court was correct in finding that financial difficulties cannot constitute
reasonable cause. The Sixth Circuit's reasoning is correct because the
withheld tax money is held in trust for the U.S. government and not re-
mitting the tax when it is due is equivalent to making the government "an
unwilling partner in a floundering business."'43 The money withheld from
employee paychecks does not technically belong to the company and the
courts should not allow business to use this money for operating
expenses.
The Van Camp court fails to consider the language of the Treasury
Regulations, which seem to differentiate between the failure to pay with-
holding taxes and the same act with regard to other taxes. The regula-
tions state, "facts and circumstances which, because of the taxpayer's
efforts to conserve assets in marketable form, may constitute reasonable
cause for nonpayment of income taxes may not constitute reasonable
cause for failure to pay over taxes described in § 7501 that are collected
or withheld from any other person. ' 44 This regulation places a heavier
burden on an employer who fails to pay over withheld taxes. Because the
monies withheld from employees do not technically belong to the em-
ployer, it is reasonable to conclude that the employer has no claim to
those funds and no right to use them for operating expenses.
The Van Camp court committed its second error by concluding that the
disallowance of financial difficulties as reasonable cause would "effec-
tively read out of the statute the 'reasonable cause' exception to the
mandatory penalties in many employment tax cases."'45 This conclusion
seems to ignore a point made earlier in its own opinion that the IRS has
38. Van Camp, 251 F.3d at 868.
39. Id.
40. Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1) (2000).
41. Van Camp, 251 F.3d at 867.
42. Id. at 868.
43. Brewery, 33 F.3d at 593 (citing Thibodeau v. United States, 828 F.2d 1499, 1506
(11th Cir. 1987)).
44. Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(2).
45. Van Camp, 251 F.3d at 868 (quoting Fran, 164 F.3d at 819).
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given eight circumstances that constitute reasonable cause. 46 The court
discounts these circumstances by stating that consideration of financial
difficulties is necessary for reasonable cause to exist in the context of em-
ployment tax. This contradicts the court's own opinion because just
before its discussion of financial problems, the court found that the dis-
trict court's "failure to examine whether Van Camp's illness was serious
enough to establish reasonable cause was clearly erroneous. '4 7 By its
own admission, even this case proves that in the employment tax context,
reasonable cause can exist without consideration of financial difficulties.
When considering the non-trust fund portion of employment taxes, the
argument in favor of the bright-line rule of Brewery is not nearly as
strong, and the logic of Van Camp seems more reasonable. With this por-
tion of the taxes, the government is essentially in line for payment along
with all of the employer's other creditors. This tax is not one that the
employer is required to pay on behalf of someone else, but is simply an-
other debt of the employer. The Brewery court concluded that the rule
should be the same for both portions of the tax.4 The court reached this
conclusion because the tax is for the employees' benefit and because
economists have concluded that employees bear the cost of the em-
ployer's share of employment tax in the form of lower wages.49 On this
issue, the court's reasoning is not as persuasive as it is with the trust fund
portion of the tax. First, the United State's tax definition of income does
not always follow the economic definition. Therefore, economists' con-
clusions should hold little weight in tax law. Secondly, these payments
are made out of the employer's operating funds. Because these funds
belong completely to the employer, it is reasonable to conclude that a
prudent businessman may logically choose to pay rent or an electric bill
before a tax bill when funds are low and a choice must be made.
As evidenced by the split in the courts, there are supportable argu-
ments on both sides of the issue of whether financial difficulties may con-
stitute reasonable cause. Because it ignored the trust fund properties of
withholding tax, the Van Camp court mistakingly concluded that the em-
ployer's financial strain can constitute reasonable cause. Van Camp's
logic, however, is quite persuasive when considering an employer's failure
to pay its own share of employment taxes. Judges dealing with this issue
should look at these portions of the tax separately. Penalties for the non-
46. Id. at 867. The court cites Boyle, 469 U.S. at 243-44 n.1. The Boyle court lists eight
circumstances that constitute reasonable cause in failing to file a return, they include "una-
voidable postal delays," "the taxpayer's reliance on the erroneous advice of an IRS officer
or employee, the death or serious illness of the taxpayer or a member of his immediate
family, the taxpayer's unavoidable absence, [and] destruction by casualty of the taxpayer's
records or place of business" (citing Internal Revenue Manual (CCH) § 4350, (24)
22.2(2)). See also Defining Reasonableness Before the Internal Revenue Service, which
identifies other events that may constitute reasonable cause, including an electronic funds
transfer that is delayed by the financial institution. Id. at 24 (citing Rev. Rul. 94-46, 1994-2
C.B. 278).
47. Van Camp, 251 F.3d at 867.
48. Brewery, 33 F.3d at 593-94.
49. Id.
2003]
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payment of the trust fund portion should never be excused because of
financial difficulties. However, the rule for the employer's portion of em-
ployment taxes should not be so harsh and should allow a consideration
of the financial standing of the employer.
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